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█ Abstract Tim Crane maintains that beliefs cannot be conscious because they persist in the absence of 
consciousness. Conscious judgments can share their contents with beliefs, and their occurrence can be ev-
idence for what one believes; but they cannot be beliefs, because they don’t persist. I challenge Crane’s 
premise that belief attributions to the temporarily unconscious are literally true. To say of an unconscious 
agent that she believes that p is like saying that she sings well. To say she sings well is to say that when she 
sings, her singing is good. To say that she believes that p is (roughly) to say that when she consciously 
considers the content that p she consciously affirms (believes) it. I also argue that the phenomenal view of 
intentional content Crane appears to endorse prima facie commits him to the view, at least controversial, 
perhaps incoherent, that there is unconscious phenomenology (the intentional contents of unconscious 
beliefs). 
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█ Riassunto Credenze coscienti – Tim Crane sostiene che le credenze non possano essere coscienti, dal 
momento che perdurano anche in assenza di coscienza. I giudizi formulati consapevolmente possono 
condividere i loro contenuti con le credenze e il loro verificarsi può essere una forma di evidenza a sup-
porto di quanto uno crede. E tuttavia essi non possono essere credenze, dal momento che non perdura-
no. Nel commento metto in discussione la premessa di Crane secondo cui porre l’attribuzione di credenze 
su un piano temporaneamente inconscio sia vero in senso letterale. Dire di un agente non cosciente che 
esso creda che p è come dire che canti bene. Dire che canti bene è dire che quando canta, il suo canto è 
buono. Dire che crede che p è (in senso lato) dire che quando considera consapevolmente il contenuto p 
costui lo afferma consapevolmente (lo crede). Inoltre intendo affermare che la visione fenomenica del 
contenuto intenzionale che Crane sembra abbracciare lo impegni prima facie nei confronti della prospet-
tiva, quantomeno controversa e probabilmente incoerente, secondo cui esisterebbe una dimensione fe-
nomenica inconscia (ossia esisterebbero contenuti intenzionali di credenze inconsce). 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Credenza; Coscienza; Inconscio; Contenuto intenzionale; Giudizio 
 

 TIM CRANE’S ASPECTS OF PSYCHOLOGISM 
is rich with insight and argument. It treats a 
number of related topics in philosophy of 
mind with Crane’s accustomed creativity, clar-
ity and rigor. The essays collected here devel-
op Crane’s approach to the philosophy of 
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mind, which stands in contrast to the past fifty 
years of theorizing in analytic philosophy. 
Crane argues, and I heartily agree, that we 
should not center philosophical investigation 
of mentality on the analysis of discourse about 
it (e.g., the semantics of propositional attitude 
ascriptions), or limit it to commentary on em-
pirical psychology. We must confront mental 
reality directly. And this must involve both 
taking phenomenal consciousness seriously 
and applying direct introspective methods to 
its study. Conceptual analysis and empirical 
psychology are of course important; but we 
must not ignore the phenomenon itself, or our 
uniquely intimate perspective on it. 
There is more than enough material in this 
beautifully written book to fund a rewarding 
career in Crane commentary. I will limit myself, 
however, to taking issue with Crane’s thesis, 
developed in essay thirteen (Unconscious Belief 
and Conscious Thought), that beliefs cannot be 
conscious. I have doubts that Crane’s argu-
ments are sufficient to establish this claim. In 
particular, I think the aptness of attributions of 
enduring mental states does not entail their lit-
eral truth. Moreover, there is a troubling prima 
facie incompatibility between the thesis and a 
view about the constitution of intentional 
(thought) content that Crane is (at least) 
tempted by – and which in my view is arguably 
correct. It seems to me that, quite to the con-
trary, this view of content (probably) entails 
that beliefs cannot be unconscious. 
Beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) 
have received philosophical attention primari-
ly as states that figure in the rationalization 
(causation and explanation) of behavior. This 
does not exhaust their nature, however, since 
we may believe things that we do not, or even 
cannot, profess or act upon. Beliefs can be rea-
sons for acting, but they can also feature in 
purely mental activity, such as reasoning, 
speculation, reflection, etc. On Crane’s view, 
«the essence of belief is that it is taking some-
thing to be the case», or «accepting or endors-
ing [a propositional] content».1 And this 
seems to me to be perfectly true. 
Propositional contents themselves (the 
somethings one takes to be the case), as men-
tally represented,2 are thoughts. A thought – a 
thinking that p – is not per se a belief. 
Thoughts can occur entirely non-committally. 
One can think that p without wishing, hoping, 
praying, planning, dreaming, etc. that p. 
Thoughts are mere entertainings, mere repre-
sentings, of propositional contents. To believe 
that p is to think that p while taking p to be the 
case – while accepting or endorsing that p. 
Again I find myself in complete agreement. 
One can, however, consciously think that p 
while consciously endorsing it. And it seems 
natural enough to take such conscious en-
dorsement of the content that p to be con-
scious belief. But Crane denies this. He 
claims that such episodes are conscious judg-
ments that p, but that they cannot be beliefs 
that p. Why does he think this? He writes: 
 
It cannot be right to say that the very same 
belief state is both conscious and uncon-
scious, if “conscious belief” is understood 
as occurrent belief. What must be meant 
(at least) by saying that a conscious belief is 
the same as an unconscious belief is that it 
has the same content: these are states in 
which you believe the same thing.3 
 
If he means that a token belief state cannot 
be both conscious and unconscious, simultane-
ously, then he is surely right. But he also says 
that an occurrent belief cannot be the very same 
thing as a dispositional belief, any more than a 
breaking can be an instance of fragility.4  
So it seems what he means is that a con-
scious belief and an unconscious belief can-
not be the same because an unconscious be-
lief is a dispositional state, while a conscious 
one is an occurrence. 
It is not clear to me that there cannot be un-
conscious occurrences of states that can also 
occur consciously – so that an unconscious be-
lief and a conscious belief would be, aside from 
the difference in consciousness, type identical. 
They would be propositional attitudes of the 
same type with the same content. I do not see 
that what Crane says rules this out. 
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However, he goes on to argue that it is al-
so of the essence of belief that it persist – past 
the moment of its acquisition, and through 
episodes of complete unconsciousness: 
 
When a belief is formed, by perception or 
other means [including conscious judg-
ment, see p. 277 – DP], it can be stored in 
the organism’s mind and then can be put at 
the service of the organism’s projects in 
various ways – either by guiding action, by 
being used in reasoning and or by being 
used in planning. For beliefs to play this 
functional role, they must continue to exist 
– that is, persist – beyond the moment of 
their acquisition.5 
 
Consciously endorsed occurrent con-
scious thoughts, obviously, cannot so persist. 
So they lack an essential feature of beliefs. So 
we may conclude that the unconscious beliefs 
Crane says can’t be type-identical to any con-
scious state are unconscious non-occurrent 
ones – those that can persist in the absence of 
any occurrent mental activity. It is this fea-
ture of belief that, Crane argues, entails that 
beliefs cannot be conscious states. 
In addition to creating belief, conscious 
endorsement of a content can reveal to one 
what one’s previously acquired belief is, or 
allow one to deliberate about what one be-
lieves. But such bringing to consciousness of 
what one believes does not count as making 
one’s belief conscious. 
Beliefs are manifested in consciousness 
through the conscious occurrence of thoughts 
sharing their contents, though they do not 
thereby themselves become conscious. Nor are 
they copies of stored beliefs: 
 
what does it mean to “bring” a state to 
phenomenal consciousness? One answer is 
clear: it is not to create another, conscious, 
version of the state itself. What is brought 
to mind when reflecting consciously on 
one’s beliefs is not itself another belief. My 
claim is that what is brought to mind is, ra-
ther, a conscious thought. 6 
Thus one may come to know what one be-
lieves in being aware of the content-matching 
conscious occurrent belief, and that one be-
lieves it by consciously endorsing its content.  
I am a bit puzzled by the first part of the 
quoted passage from page 271. When a belief 
is formed by perception or conscious judg-
ment, it is consciously formed. But then is the 
belief, upon its formation, not conscious? 
What is it for it – the consciously formed be-
lief which is not yet in storage – to be stored? 
This cannot be taken literally if it is to be 
consistent with Crane’s overall view, since 
storage implies persistence through uncon-
sciousness, and conscious states do not so 
persist. So what he must mean is that an en-
during acceptance-state sharing its content 
and attitudinal component is created along 
with the formation of the conscious. 
But what if no such state is created? What 
if I consciously endorse the thought that p 
and then immediately forget that I did, and 
form no memory of the acceptance of it? Or 
quickly change my mind? Why should this 
not be a temporary conscious belief – espe-
cially if it shares the functional role charac-
teristic of belief? If I consciously endorse it 
and act upon it, why should I not be believing 
it? Why can’t there be temporary, non-
persisting beliefs? («For a moment there, I 
believed that Trump might be a serious can-
didate. Fortunately, I came to my senses»). 
Beliefs can be stored for future use; but what is 
the argument that they must be stored? 
The important question for Crane, howev-
er, is what beliefs must be like given that they 
can be stored and persist through mental inac-
tivity. And his argument is that since con-
scious judgments are occurrent they cannot be 
stored in the way beliefs are; hence, conscious 
judgments cannot be beliefs. Judgments can-
not persist the way beliefs do because they are 
events, while beliefs are states, and events and 
states are of fundamentally different meta-
physical categories. To be in a state is to in-
stantiate a property, and, Crane argues, it 
makes no sense to talk of states having tem-
poral parts (the way events do): 
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My having the height I do is a state of me; 
it makes no sense to talk about the earlier 
part or the later part of my having the 
height I do.7 
 
Though my being in that state can persist 
over time – I can be 4 feet tall for 6 months – 
the state itself is just the instantiation of the 
property. My being in that state – the contin-
ued instantiation of that property for 6 
months – is an event, and so can have tem-
poral parts. But my being in the state is not 
the same as the state. 
It does seem correct to say that a judg-
ment cannot be a lasting state. It seems I 
could no more judge that p for 6 months than 
I could say that p for six months. I could 
judge or say that p again and again for 6 
months, but that would be just to make the 
judgment or statement over and over.8 
But I wonder, then, how it can be that be-
lief is essentially a taking-to-be or accepting or 
endorsement, if these are events (occurrences – 
mental acts), and as such, by Crane’s meta-
physical lights, cannot persist the way belief 
does. What could it be to persistently instan-
tiate the property of endorsing that p, if en-
dorsement is an event? To repeatedly instan-
tiate it? This hardly seems plausible. 
Crane distinguishes three types of con-
scious judgment;9 but he does not say any-
thing in this paper about unconscious judg-
ment. Perhaps he would not agree that there is 
such a thing. Perhaps he would claim that tak-
ing-to-be-the-case, endorsing and accepting 
are not forms of judgment – or that there are 
other forms that are not episodic. Perhaps 
there is an unconscious analogue of judgment 
– maybe some kind of functional state. On 
such an account unconscious judgment would 
dispositional, since, clearly, one does not al-
ways act upon everything one believes. And 
this would fit nicely with Crane’s thesis that 
beliefs themselves are dispositional states: be-
liefs are dispositions to make positive con-
scious judgments (as well as to behave in cer-
tain ways in certain circumstances?). 
This brings me to my main objections to 
Crane’s view. He supports his claim that be-
liefs (can?) survive the absence of conscious-
ness with the intuition that there’s something 
very wrong with saying that an individual 
ceases to believe what he believes when he 
ceases to consciously endorse it. This intui-
tion is quite strong. I think one needs a very 
good reason to reject it. I think I have one. 
It seems to me that when one says of a 
dreamless sleeper that she believes that 
Viktor Orbán wants to rule the world, what 
one says is like what one would say if one said 
that she sings well, or has a good voice. Nei-
ther of these requires that we take singing or 
having a good voice themselves to be disposi-
tional states. Rather, when we say of the si-
lent sleeper that she sings well, what we are 
saying is that, though she is not now singing, 
when she does she is good at it. What she re-
tains while not singing is the disposition to 
sing well. And the same should be said, I 
think, of belief. The dreamless sleeper is not 
actually in the state of believing that Viktor 
Orbán wants to rule the world; she is in the 
state of being disposed so to believe. 
Having a persisting belief in your brain is 
like having a photograph on the hard drive of 
your computer. There are not really any photo-
graphs in your computer. (Look closely; you 
will not see any.) What there are are disposi-
tions to (re)produce photographs (on the com-
puter screen, on printer paper, or whatever). 
We make many acceptable ostensibly cat-
egorical claims about individuals which 
should be taken to be ascriptions of disposi-
tions to be in states rather than ascriptions of 
being in those states. The dreamless sleeper 
may be truly said to be a dazzling conversa-
tionalist, or to have a Liverpool accent, or to 
be writing a novel, when she could not be 
said to be with conversing or speaking or 
writing. Though these claims may truly be 
made when the subject is in fact doing the 
things mentioned, they may also be used to 
make merely dispositional claims.  
There is a difference between being dis-
posed to believe what one has already con-
sciously accepted and being disposed to be-
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lieve what one had never considered. And 
this might allow for a stronger sense in which 
the dreamless sleeper may be said to believe 
what she affirmed while awake. For in this 
case one’s evidence for the attribution is not 
a general fact about what people are in gen-
eral likely to affirm once it is put to them, but 
rather a specific fact about what has been af-
firmed by a given individual (together with 
the supposition that there is no reason to 
suspect that she has changed her mind). 
Thus, I do not think it can be inferred 
from the aptness of the claim that the dream-
less sleeper believes that Viktor Orbán wants 
to rule the world that she is right then, at the 
time of attribution, in a state that is the belief 
that Viktor Orbán wants to rule the world. 
The aptness-maker in this case is a disposition 
to be in a belief state. It is, at that moment, no 
more literally true that she believes this of 
Orbán than that there are pictures of her visit 
to Estonia in her turned-off computer. 
And this leads me to my second major wor-
ry about Crane’s view. There are no pictures on 
hard drives because none of their states 
(whether the computer is on or off) have photo-
graphic content – by which I mean the colors, 
shapes, etc. that (at least in part) determine 
what a picture is of. At best there are coded in-
structions for producing things that have pho-
tographic content. And something exactly 
analogous holds of states of the non-
experiencing brain: they cannot have phenom-
enal content. Crane is well aware of this:  
 
 If phenomenal character is the character 
of phenomenal episodes, and these are ep-
isodes in the stream of consciousness, be-
liefs can never have phenomenal charac-
ter. But thoughts – in the sense character-
ized in §4 above – do have phenomenal 
character, since they are episodes in the 
stream of consciousness.10 
 
But this creates a serious potential problem 
for him. Though he does not commit himself 
to it in this paper, Crane seems sympathetic to 
the thesis that «conscious thoughts have a 
phenomenal intentionality to call their 
own».11 However, he clearly cannot hold this 
consistently with holding that the contents of 
conscious thoughts are identical to the con-
tents of (unconscious, dispositional) beliefs. 
Unconscious dispositions are not experiences, 
and so cannot have phenomenal properties. 
So belief contents on his view cannot be phe-
nomenally constituted.  
Crane seems faced with the following 
choice: either give up the phenomenal inten-
tionality of thought thesis, give up the thesis 
that beliefs and conscious thoughts can have 
the same content, or give up the thesis that 
beliefs are unconscious dispositional states. 
In my view, there are very good reasons to 
think that thought content is phenomenally 
constituted.12 And it does not seem at all ad-
visable to deny that thoughts and beliefs can 
have the same intentional contents. So, my 
advice would be to give up the thesis that be-
liefs cannot be conscious, and accept that 
(unless there can be unconscious occurrent 
states with phenomenal character),13 on the 
contrary, beliefs cannot be unconscious. 
What persists in the absence of occurrent 
mental activity is not beliefs, but dispositions 
to believe. Believing is essentially an occur-
rent, experiential phenomenon. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 T. CRANE, Aspects of Psychologism, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge (MA) 2014, pp. 270-271. 
2 I would argue that propositional contents are 
mentally instantiated. See D. PITT, Intentional 
Psychologism, in: «Philosophical Studies», vol. 
CXLVI, n. 1, 2009, pp. 117-138. 
3 T. CRANE, Aspects of Psychologism, cit., p. 270. 
4 Ibidem. 
5 Ivi, p. 271. 
6 Ivi, p. 276. 
7 Ivi, p. 275. 
8 Though perhaps one could be in the (no doubt 
fatally boring) state of constantly judging that p 
for six months? 
9 See T. CRANE, Aspects of Psychologism, cit., p. 277. 
10 Ivi, p. 279. 
11 Ivi, p. 280. 
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12 See D. PITT, Introspection, Phenomenality and the 
Availability of Intentional Content, in: T. BAYNE, M. 
MONTAGUE (eds.), Cognitive  Phenomenology, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp. 141-173; D. 
PITT,  Intentional Psychologism, cit.;  D. PITT,  The  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What Is It Like to 
Think That P?, in: «Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research», vol. LXIX, n. 1, 2004, pp. 1-36. 
13 I wrestle with this question in D. PITT, The 
Quality of Thought, chapter 5 (forthcoming). 
